Monetary Policy in a Small Economy after Tsunami: A New Consensus on the Horizon? by Jan Frait et al.
Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1                                          5 
JEL Classification: E52, E58, E61, G12, G18 
Keywords: monetary policy, financial stability, asset markets, macroprudential policy 
Monetary Policy in a Small Economy after Tsunami: 
A New Consensus on the Horizon?
* 
Jan FRAIT – Czech National Bank, Technical University of Ostrava (jan.frait@cnb.cz) and 
University of Finance and Administration, Prague (corresponding author)  
Zlatuše KOMÁRKOVÁ – Czech National Bank (zlatuse.komarkova@cnb.cz) 
Luboš KOMÁREK – Czech National Bank, Technical University of Ostrava and University 
of Finance and Administration, Prague (lubos.komarek@cnb.cz)  
Abstract 
The last financial crisis significantly changed views concerning the relationship between 
monetary policy, asset prices and financial stability. We survey the pre-crisis opinions on 
the appropriate monetary policy reactions to financial market developments and deline-
ate the new consensus which is currently emerging from the lessons taken. The new con-
sensus is an amended model of flexible inflation targeting in which the central bank 
“should sometimes lean and can clean”. We try to add the small open economy context to 
the debate and demonstrate that the optimal reactions of monetary policy-makers in small 
open economies may differ and that sometimes the optimal solution may not even be 
available due to the policies of the key world central banks acting as price makers. In 
such instances, second-best policies have to be considered. 
 
“The modern central banker needs to be open to the reality of the ongo-
ing structural changes around him, and to keep an open mind as to how 
monetary policy might best be used to enhance the welfare of the citi-
zens for whom he or she is responsible.“  
William R. White (2002) 
1. Introduction 
In the second half of the 1980s, in response to the high inflation of the pre-
vious two decades, central banks focused on achieving price stability, i.e. low and 
stable inflation, as their primary objective. In most countries, price stability was 
achieved relatively quickly – in advanced countries by the early 1990s and in emerg-
ing and developing ones in the second half of the 1990s. Inflation expectations in 
many countries started to be strongly and successfully affected by explicit or implicit 
inflation targets.  
The restoration of price stability, the fall in inflation expectations and the ef-
forts of many countries to stop their currencies appreciating led to a considerable 
decline in nominal interest rates. At the start of the last decade, severe disinflationary 
and deflationary pressures pushed short-term and long-term nominal interest rates to 
historically low values, at least from the post-war perspective. As a result, various 
real interest rate measures also declined markedly, although perhaps less so than 
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Figure 1  The Price of Risk – What Goes Down Must Come Up  
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some economic agents thought. In this environment of low inflation and stable in-
flation expectations, moreover, central banks did not have to respond to the economic 
recovery by rapidly tightening monetary policy as they had in previous boom and 
bust cycles. This fostered a reduction in the short- to medium-term volatility of real 
economic activity. The view started to prevail that a “Great Moderation” had occurr-
ed in the world economy and that a long period of low and stable inflation and high 
and stable economic growth lay ahead. Although the financial markets experienced 
no such stabilisation (see section 2), financial institutions also gradually started be-
lieving that the Great Moderation, together with better risk management by financial 
institutions, would lead to a fall in credit and market risks. This resulted in a gradual 
decline in risk premia (credit spreads, interest rate margins) as measures of the price 
of risk of loans and other debt products. The biggest decline in the risky assets’ yield 
spreads over relevant “risk-free” benchmarks occurred during the boom around the mid-
dle of the last decade (Figure 1).
1 Even though this decline was explained at the time 
by the effects of the Great Moderation and financial institutions’ improved ability to 
manage risks, in reality financial markets were losing part of their capacity to value 
risk. This was fully revealed following the onset of the crisis in 2007 and 2008, when 
spreads increased dramatically. In the last decade, therefore, financial markets expe-
rienced a tsunami effect, as risk first disappeared from the markets like water from 
the oceans only to return with a vengeance at the start of the crisis in the form of 
a destructive tidal wave.
2  
The onset of the Great Moderation coincided with the development of the the-
ory and models of inflation targeting. In the  years before the  crisis, a  consensus 
reflecting the  theoretical and empirical studies published over the  previous two 
decades completely prevailed among mainstream theoreticians and policy-makers. 
1 What was rather abnormal was that it happened on the background of central banks’ policy tightening. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1                                          7 
Bean et al. (2010) talk about this consensus as a synthesis of the rigour of dynamic 
general equilibrium modelling with the empirical realism of sticky-price Keynesian 
thinking. Mishkin (2010) refers to it as the “science of monetary policy” based on 
the new neoclassical synthesis (as defined by Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999) and 
transformed into a system of flexible inflation targeting. One of the major effects of 
the strength of this consensus was a strong belief in the potential of monetary policy 
and in central banks’ ability to leverage this potential. However, the financial crisis 
that started in summer 2007 severely damaged the existing consensus regarding mone-
tary policy strategy, and a search for a new consensus began. 
This article focuses on the debate concerning the relationship between mone-
tary policy, asset prices and financial stability in the last twenty years or so. Besides 
surveying the literature from both the academic and central banking communities, it 
attempts to extend the debate to the small open economy context. It explains how 
the lessons from the last financial crisis have affected the consensus about the proper 
way of conducting monetary policy and how a new consensus is emerging. Since 
the focus of the article is primarily on the general and long-term framework for 
monetary policy, some issues – such as the zero lower bound and quantitative easing 
– are left nearly untouched. The article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes 
the predominant view on the optimal reaction of central banks to the asset price 
movements existing in the pre-crisis years. Section 3 reviews features of the views of 
economists of the  Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which were in many 
aspects different to the predominant view. Section 4 confronts the developments in 
the  world economy in the  pre-crisis years with both the  predominant and the  BIS 
views described in the  previous sections. Section 5 explains how the  small open 
economy context modifies the depicted landscape and refers to the challenges faced 
by some economies during the pre-crisis period. In section 6 we sum up the lessons 
from the crisis and outline the monetary policy framework that is in our view emerg-
ing as the new consensus. Finally, section 7 returns to the small open economy con-
text and discusses policy constraints in relation to the new consensus, and section 8 
concludes.  
2. The Great Moderation versus the Asset Markets‘ Wilderness 
Although the  restoration of price stability and the  low economic volatility 
undoubtedly helped to reduce some significant risk sources in financial markets, 
the expected stabilisation of asset prices and the financial markets did not take place. 
On the contrary, fluctuations in asset markets increased and were accompanied by 
2 The comparison of the financial crisis with a tsunami was first used by Alan Greenspan on 23 October
2008 in his Congressional testimony before the Committee of Government Oversight and Reform, which
he started by saying: “We are in the midst of a once-in-a-century credit tsunami”. What he had in mind, 
however, was only the shocking deterioration of credit markets that occurred after the Lehman Brothers 
failure. We nevertheless think that the more important tsunami-like aspect was the near disappearance 
of credit risk margins from international financial markets in the mid-2000s. In other words, the correct 
description of the credit tsunami has to take into account both periods of risk motion. By the way, the one-
way description of events is a nice example of the asymmetric approach of Fed officials as well as US
academics (see section 2). To be fair, Greenspan on number of occasions pointed to the risks building up 
in the economy while warning that history cautions that people experiencing long periods of relative sta-
bility are prone to excess. After all, it was he who brought the "irrational exuberance" concept into central 
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sharp changes in credit dynamics. Economists responded in the late 1990s by open-
ing a major debate on whether monetary policy should actively seek to encourage 
asset price stability, or even whether it should attempt to prevent or at least reduce 
asset price bubbles.  
Central banks automatically take asset price developments into account when 
setting monetary policy, even if formally they focus on price stability defined solely 
in terms of the consumer price index. This is primarily because large movements in 
asset prices have implications for CPI inflation. Rapid rises in the prices of real es-
tate, for example, may put some pressure on the price of building materials. In ad-
dition to such direct impacts, asset price movements can feed into CPI inflation 
through the “wealth effect”. As asset prices rise, people tend to feel wealthier and 
consume more. Due to these effects the debate on the response of monetary policy to 
asset price movements has always been not whether it should respond at all, but 
whether it should respond over and above the response associated with the objective 
of stabilising inflation and output. 
This particular debate arises from the fact that asset prices feed through to 
the economy in other ways than the ones discussed above. For example, asset price 
increases improve balance sheets, increasing the borrowing capacity of firms and in-
dividuals. Increases in net worth tend to increase the willingness of lenders to lend 
and borrowers to borrow, facilitating a general expansion in spending as well as an ex-
pansion in spending on investment in appreciating assets. Though most of the time, 
asset and consumer prices roughly move together, there are times when asset prices 
move well out of line with underlying economic fundamentals. Sometimes, asset 
prices can become disconnected from reasonable expectations of future earnings, re-
sulting in speculative bubbles that cannot be justified by economic fundamentals. 
Sooner or later, speculative bubbles will burst. But the damage they can do to the econ-
omy can sometimes be huge. Thus there is the question of whether central banks 
should try to constrain asset price bubbles.  
The predominant “benign neglect” view in the literature prior to the current 
crisis was that a central bank should pay attention to asset market developments, but 
cannot and should not try to constrain asset price bubbles on their own. The classical 
and influential contributions justifying this particular view were provided by Bernan-
ke and Gertler (1999, 2001).
3 They argue that central banks should focus primarily 
on underlying inflationary pressures and that asset prices can become relevant only to 
the extent that they may signal potential inflationary or deflationary forces. Policy 
rules responding directly to asset prices would provide few if any additional gains. 
They could even bring greater variability in the real economy, interest rates and ex-
change rates. They also argue that monetary policy is not a sufficient tool to contain 
the potentially damaging effects of booms and busts in asset prices and that strategy 
to insulate the economy from financial disturbances should be based on transparent 
legal and accounting systems, a sound regulatory structure that helps to limit the risk 
exposure of banks and corporations, and prudent fiscal policies that help instil public 
confidence in economic fundamentals. Bernanke (2002) then suggested a very simple 
rule for central bank policy regarding asset market instability defined in line with 
3 See also Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) or Blinder and Reis (2005). The critical summary of the view is 
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the Tinbergen separation principle (Tinbergen, 1952). He basically says that the Fed 
has two sets of responsibilities – maximum sustainable employment, stable prices 
and moderate long-term interest rates on the one hand, and the stability of the fi-
nancial system on the other. To achieve that, the Fed has two sets of policy tools: 
policy interest rates and a range of powers with respect to financial institutions. In 
this setting, the Fed should use the right tool for the job, i.e. the Fed will do its best 
by focusing its monetary policy instruments on achieving macro goals, while using 
its regulatory, supervisory and lender-of-last resort powers to help ensure financial 
stability. This particular rule subsequently held sway in the deliberations of the cen-
tral banking community. 
There was, however, a second stream developing alongside the predominant 
view, which favoured a more active monetary policy approach to asset price swings. 
Economists from this camp argued for a lean-against-the-bubble strategy.
4 A special 
subgroup consisted of the writings of BIS economists (see the next section). The pro-
ponents of leaning assert that a central bank should take account of, and respond to, 
the implications of asset-price changes for its macro-goal variables. A well-known 
example of the “leaners” approach is Cecchetti et al. (2000)
5, which applies the clas-
sic Poole (1970) analysis and concludes that a  central bank should “lean against 
the  wind” of significant asset price movements if these disturbances originate in 
the asset markets themselves. In contrast, if a disturbance originates in the real sector, 
asset prices should be allowed to change in order to absorb part of the required ad-
justment. They conclude that an inflation-targeting central bank is likely to succeed 
by adjusting its policy rates not only in response to its forecast of the inflation and 
output gap, but also in response to asset prices. They believe that such an approach 
could also reduce output volatility. This conclusion is based on the view that reaction 
to asset prices in the normal course of policy making will reduce the likelihood of 
asset price misalignments arising in the first place. On the other hand, the authors 
were not recommending that central banks either seek to burst bubbles currently per-
ceived to exist, or target specific levels of asset prices. Furthermore, they do not re-
commend responding to all changes in asset prices in the same way or including asset 
prices directly in measures of inflation. They just say that it is important for cen- 
tral bankers to develop a framework for policy making that accounts for the various 
sources of uncertainty that they face in meeting their objectives. 
While confirming their previous stand, Cecchetti et al. (2002) admit that set-
ting policy rates on the  basis of conscious deviations of expected inflation from 
the target could hurt credibility. The outcome could be that policy becomes less pre-
dictable and less transparent. In practice, attempts to set interest rates at a  level 
4 Bernanke (2002) strongly argues against a much more activist approach, which he brands “aggressive
bubble-popping”. He regards such a strategy, i.e. the use of monetary policy tools for pricking asset bub-
bles, as risky and dangerous. He points to the Fed action in 1929, when the Fed tried to prick the stock 
market bubble but succeeded only in killing the economy. Ferguson (2005) finds a similar pattern in Japan 
during the 1990s, which resulted in the lost decade of the Japanese economy. However, we find that sup-
port for aggressive bubble popping is rather low in both the academic and central banking communities. 
Roubini (2006) explains that the deliberate use of monetary policy for bursting bubbles might appear opti-
mal in models in which the bubble is endogenous. He nevertheless talks about careful, not aggressive, bub-
ble pricking. 
5 Other important contribution represent Blanchard (2000) or Bordo and Jeanne (2002).  10                                      Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1 
different from what is necessary to achieve the target level at the two-year horizon 
must be accompanied by a justification that is explained simply and that commands 
broad agreement. Otherwise, policymakers who consciously aim away from their tar-
get at the two-year horizon (in order to reduce inflation volatility at other horizons) 
would attract suspicion if their explanation for doing so was too complex and not 
well-understood. 
The lean-against-the-bubble strategy has always been acknowledged as not 
entirely without merit even by supporters of the predominant view. They have always 
agreed that it might be worthwhile for a central bank to take out some “insurance” 
against the formation of an asset-price bubble and its potentially adverse effects. 
They have nevertheless believed that leaning against the bubble was unlikely to be 
productive in practice. A  few traditional and seemingly strong arguments against 
the leaning strategy have been used in this debate.  
First, a central bank cannot reliably identify bubbles in asset prices, since it 
does not have any information advantage relative to private market participants. In 
particular, it is rather difficult to know at any particular point in time whether the in-
crease in an asset price reflects fundamental improvements or excessively optimistic 
expectations.
6 The second problem is the timing of the central bank’s reaction. Gen-
erally, asset price changes have an impact on inflation at a different horizon than 
the one usually associated with monetary policy-making. Specifically, once a central 
bank becomes certain that a bubble has emerged, it will probably be too late to act 
with interest rate hikes.  
Third, pursuing a separate asset price objective could mean having to compro-
mise on the inflation objective. Seeking to stabilise rising house prices or an overheated 
stock market might mean having to force inflation lower than would otherwise be 
required. Such a policy can lead to accusations by politicians and the media that 
the central bank is going beyond its remit. Fourth, a central bank’s focus on assets 
could lead to public confusion about its policy objectives. Giavazzi and Mishkin (2006) 
in their assessment of the Riksbank’s inflation-targeting performance suggested that 
statements on house prices as a decisive factor in policy rate setting confused the pub-
lic and led to a general weakening of confidence in the central bank’s policy frame-
work.
7  
The fifth and probably strongest objection is that even if a central bank can 
identify bubbles, monetary policy does not possess appropriate tools for effective use 
against them. It might be rather difficult to calibrate the appropriate tightening. A small 
increase in the policy interest rate can only lead to a correspondingly modest decline 
in the likelihood or size of a bubble. It is unlikely that a small increase in short-term 
interest rates, unaccompanied by a significant slowdown of the economy, will induce 
6 The leaners are nevertheless sure that on some occasions one can be quite sure that a bubble is on 
the way, because fundamentals behind the asset price drift simply cannot be identified. They also argue 
that doubts about this capacity are based on a strong form of efficient market hypothesis leading to the false
belief that incorporating all available information eliminates any misalignments. 
7 The Executive Board of the Riksbank raised the repo rate by 0.25 percentage point in February 2006,
communicating that although the inflation forecast had been revised downward and the inflation forecast 
was below the 2% target at the policy horizon, the rapid rise in household indebtedness and house prices 
justified  the hike.  A similar  debate emerged during the  Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee 
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speculators to modify their equity or real estate investment plans. Interest rates 
simply may have limited power to affect the perceptions that move asset prices in 
the first place. To materially affect some asset prices, such as housing, interest rates 
would probably need to move by much more than would be required just to keep CPI 
inflation comfortably within the target range. Since interest rate changes affect not 
just house prices, but also the prices of most other assets, goods and services, there 
would be secondary, unintended consequences, with potentially serious consequences 
for the economy as a whole. 
The argument regarding the small impact of monetary policy interest rates on 
asset prices and asset price bubbles has been heavily used in the debate regarding 
the  contribution of monetary policies to the  build-up of vulnerabilities leading to 
the recent crisis. Posen (2009) warns that authorities that would like to lean simply 
do not have a tool that works. He provides international evidence that monetary 
policy instruments do not predictably or dependably influence asset prices. In partic-
ular, nominal or even real policy rate changes do not seem to have had any impact 
during a wide range of booms. Extremely severe monetary tightening could have 
worked, but only at the price of large output losses.  
3. The BIS Approach, or the Austrian Business Cycle Revisited  
An alternative approach to the predominant view was championed by econo-
mists around the BIS, whose opinions were based to some extent on those of certain 
representatives of the Austrian business cycle school. Although their studies provided 
significant inspiration for leaners in the academic community, the opinions of the aca-
demic mainstream were affected only to a small extent by the BIS economists’ ap-
proach, probably because they were not presented in the formal manner prevailing in 
the theoretical literature.
8 The BIS economists concluded following their empirical 
observations that achieving both price and output stability still does not automatically 
guarantee financial stability and asked why the economies after the emergence of 
the Great Moderation regularly exhibit symptoms of financial instability in the form 
of currency, banking and debt crises. They agreed that a whole range of factors con-
tribute to the onset of financial instability symptoms. However, they spied one of 
the primary causes of financial instability in a phenomenon that has simultaneously 
contributed to the stabilisation of inflation – the behavior of globalised, liberalised 
financial markets. The ability to support or even cause radical changes in macroeco-
nomic dynamics had become one of its features.  
Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001), Borio, English and Filardo (2003) and Borio 
and White (2004) provide detailed descriptions of the implications of liberalised mar-
kets for macroeconomic dynamics. In the context of the liberalisation and globalisa-
tion of financial markets, they talk about the elevated or even excessive elasticity of 
the economic system, by which they mean the system’s internal potential to gradually 
generate financial imbalances
9 that cannot be kept under control by existing mechan-
8 The studies of other economists drawing on the arguments of the Austrian school were also largely ig-
nored in the theoretical literature. A typical example is Hyman Minsky, whose long-neglected opinions re-
turned to the centre of theorists’ attention only when the crisis erupted.  
9 By financial imbalances we understand disequlibria on both macro (external balance, fiscal balance) and
micro (maturity and currency mismatches, excessively leveraged agents) levels.  12                                      Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1 
isms and are ultimately corrected through financial instability. Despite the fact that 
more efficient monetary policies helped to reduce short-term output volatility and 
prolong expansions at the expense of recessions, liberalised financial markets have 
created favourable environment for endogenous “boom and bust” cycles. They do this 
through their increased ability to amplify natural pro-cyclical elements in the behav- 
ior of financial institutions and their interactions with the real economy. In particular,  
in periods characterized by low volatility of inflation and stable economic growth 
market participants may be led to underestimate the level of risk in the economy. 
And due to the intense competition, financial institutions and their clients have sig-
nificant incentives to take on more risk than before. They can do so because when 
an economy starts to experience good times, access to external sources of financing 
improves significantly. In the new environment, such access is more dependent on 
current risk perceptions on the side of both banks and their clients, which, in turn, are 
strongly dependent on current economic activity. So, during good times when cycli-
cal improvements are confused with long-term boosts in productivity, virtuous circles 
can evolve, initiated by the higher readiness of firms and households to take on debt 
and use it for buying risky assets. Processes develop which manifests themselves in 
dampened risk perceptions, asset price drifts, lower external financing constraints on 
firms, households and governments and high investment activity from firms which is 
reflected in growth in production and profitability. Against the background of this 
virtuous circle, excessive financial imbalances as sources of systemic risks may be 
building up unnoticed. However, they often show up after a long lag, when economic 
activity weakens as a result of some kind of stimulus. Then a contraction occurs and 
reactions set in. When economic agents realise that the economy has been growing in 
an unsustainable manner and the debt is excessive, they start trying to restructure 
their balance sheets. This results in a decline in income, investment and asset prices. 
To a large extent these processes are natural, as they are cyclical fluctuations. However, 
things can sometimes go too far and a vicious circle may follow. When the adjust-
ment is combined with a decrease in the external financing of firms and households 
owing to a more cautious approach from banks, the  downward movement can be 
precipitate and destabilising. The last episode of financial instability, which started in 
2007, was global in nature and has been associated with huge macroeconomic costs. 
The principal contributions of BIS economists to the debate on the relation-
ship between monetary policy, asset prices and financial stability are Borio and Lowe 
(2002), Borio, English and Filardo (2003) and Borio and White (2004). The starting 
point in this literature is that financial imbalances can build up in a low-inflation 
environment and that in some circumstances it is appropriate for policy to respond to 
contain these imbalances. They point out that a highly credible monetary policy fo-
cused on price stability can paradoxically even contribute to the build-up of financial 
imbalances. If inflation expectations are strongly anchored, demand-pull inflationary 
pressures may accumulate for quite some time without being fully reflected in actual 
inflation.
10 Excess demand pressures may show up first in credit aggregates and asset 
prices, rather than in the prices of goods and services, which can make it harder for 
monetary policy to be sufficiently pre-emptive. If explicit or implicit inflation targets 
10 If central banks in their forecasting models estimate the output gap on the basis of current inflation, 
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are defined for too short a horizon in this environment, which, given central banks’ 
efforts to achieve accountability, is natural, the response to potential inflation pres-
sures may be postponed for quite some time. Monetary policy will then accom-
modate the  build-up of financial imbalances and associated distortions in the  real 
economy – notably excessive capital accumulation, until it is too late and the risk of 
financial instability arises.
11 In the light of these particular framework features, longer 
policy horizons and a greater emphasis on the balance of risks in economic projec-
tions, as opposed to central scenarios or most likely outcomes, were recommended. 
Borio and White (2004) acknowledge that protecting against the  afore-
mentioned processes and the risks they generate is not easy. At the basic level they 
recommend combining monetary policy oriented towards price stability with macro-
prudential policy
12 oriented towards financial stability. Such policy focuses more on 
preventing episodes of systemic financial distress that have implications for the real 
economy rather than on the  problems of individual institutions (unless they are 
systemically important). Such policy must also think further about the financial sys-
tem’s inclination towards excessive procyclicality and its implications for economic 
dynamics and macroeconomic stability. Monetary policy should have a central posi-
tion in the new macroprudential framework, since it is ultimately the banking sector 
that creates liquidity and provides the bulk of external financing. Monetary policy 
oriented towards pursuing simultaneous price and financial stability in the long run, 
along with other elements of macroprudential policy, should provide mutually sup-
portive anchors ensuring greater macroeconomic stability. Borio and White therefore 
suggest that the role of monetary policy would be to anchor the liquidity creation 
process and, hence, the availability of external finance, since lending plays a key role 
in determining macroeconomic dynamics. Such anchoring would help to reduce 
the “elasticity” of the economy, i.e. its ability to generate financial imbalances, there-
by providing critical support to prudential policy. The authorities could implement it 
by being prepared to lean against the build-up of financial imbalances by tightening 
policy, when necessary, even if near-term inflation pressures were not apparent. The ra-
tionale for such a strategy is not just to cool down the economy in a particular phase 
of economic upswing. More importantly, it would seek to limit the downside risks for 
the macroeconomy in the medium to long term. It would also take out some insur-
ance against the risk of monetary policy losing effectiveness due to the zero lower 
bound.  
The BIS economists thus decisively challenge the traditional objections to 
the leaning-against-the wind strategy (see section 2). As to the key problem relating 
to bubble identification, they say that it is simply a wrong focus. The proper one 
should be placed on financial imbalances and not so much on asset price bubbles. 
Even though identifying financial imbalances ex ante is not easy, it is certain that 
sustained rapid credit growth combined with large drifts in asset prices increases 
the probability of a future episode of financial instability. It is financial imbalances 
11 For a central bank with inflation currently below the inflation target, it would be very difficult to explain 
that it is tightening monetary policy because it is afraid that in three or four years the accumulated im-
balances could cause inflation pressures or problems in the financial sector and, conversely, deflationary 
pressures subsequently if the unsustainable trend were to end in recession, financial repression and a sub-
sequent slump in demand.  
12 The BIS view of macroprudential policy is defined in Borio (2003, 2010).  14                                      Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1 
that contribute to imbalances in the real economy and put long-term economic growth  
at risk. On top of that, Cecchetti et al. (2000) comment that the difficulties associated 
with measuring asset price misalignments are not substantially different from those 
of estimating theoretical constructs such as potential output or the equilibrium real 
interest rate.  
BIS economists also took the lead in challenging the other important aspect  
of the  pre-crisis thinking about monetary policy, namely the  “can’t lean, but can 
clean” policy asymmetry (see, for example, White, 2006). Many in the central bank-
ing community subscribed to the view that monetary policy would not be effective in 
“leaning” against the upswing of a credit cycle but that lower interest rates would be 
effective in “cleaning” up afterwards.
13 White (2009) finds the “can’t lean, but can 
clean” propositions seriously deficient, since monetary policies designed solely to deal 
with short-term problems of insufficient demand could make medium-term problems 
worse by encouraging a build-up of debt to unsustainable levels. Loose monetary 
policy can temporarily succeed in postponing the  necessary adjustment of inter-
temporal disequilibria, but only at the expense of a deeper downturn in the future.
14 
Instead, monetary policy should be focused more on “pre-emptive tightening” to 
moderate credit booms than on “pre-emptive easing” to deal with the after-effects. If 
recommendations derived from the  two points described above are embodied in 
monetary policy strategy, better macroeconomic outcomes can be available. In par-
ticular, if the authorities are expected to react to financial imbalances, agents may be 
more responsive to the policy tightening. Moreover, communicating a reaction func-
tion of this type ex ante might even diminish the likelihood of imbalances evolving, 
in a similar way that the credibility of inflation targets tends to anchor inflation ex-
pectations. By contrast, expectations of asymmetrical reactions by central banks, i.e. 
easing only when imbalances unwind, can contribute the build-up of such imbal-
ances. 
4. Global Liquidity, Asset Prices and Monetary Policy before the Crisis 
Not only BIS economists, but also the economic community in general, were 
aware that the pre-crisis decade was a period of rapid global economic growth on 
the one hand and the build-up of significant risks due to financial market develop-
ments on the other. The fact is, however, that there was not much open debate in 
central banks about making fundamental changes to the  existing monetary policy 
paradigm. One reason was that financial sector developments played a relatively 
small role in the  prevailing models and the  economy was almost always close to 
equilibrium in them. And if it did deviate from equilibrium, it was supposed to return 
quickly to it in a model economy. As a result, the possibility that the actual economy 
might in reality have been facing an “original sin” problem was not conceded.  
13 The “can’t lean, but can clean“ strategy is also called the Greenspan doctrine, since it was the former Fed
chairman who argued that monetary policy should not try to lean against bubbles, but should clean up after
they burst. For financial market participants this policy asymmetry created the “Greenspan Put”, i.e. the in-
vestor perception of put protection on asset prices by the central bank providing ample liquidity in the case 
of a sharp market downturn.  
14 Even though not said by White explicitly, the “can’t lean, but can clean” approach creates a similar pat-
tern as the one described by Friedman’s version of the Philips curve, only instead of the need for a further 
acceleration of inflation, a deepening of the intertemporal imbalance is called for. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1                                          15 
“Original sin” refers to the  situation where an  economy – owing to endo-
genous or exogenous events – undergoes a large deviation from equilibrium which 
can then be maintained in the medium run, for example through monetary policy. For 
instance, an unsustainable boom can be generated in the economy which manifests 
itself more in public finance and current account deficits than in inflationary pres-
sures. The desired elimination of the intertemporal imbalance can be delayed for 
some time by continuing or accelerating supportive economic policies.
15 In monetary 
policy models with short horizons and rapid adjustment of imbalances, however, fast 
output growth during a boom can be interpreted as growth in potential output, hence 
analyses can result in a recommendation to maintain low interest rates in an economy 
that is much overheated in reality.  
From the current perspective it is quite clear that Western economies were 
much more overheated before the crisis than indicated by the output gap estimates, 
which were ultimately derived to some extent from the existing inflationary pres-
sures. The underestimation of the overheating and its impacts on systemic risk was 
probably due to an extraordinary combination of temporary positive technological 
shocks, the involvement of a whole range of new countries in international trade, and 
market reforms in the former communist countries. These factors led to a seemingly 
permanent and pronounced increase in productivity. Another important factor in 
the pre-crisis years was the rapidly rising private sector and government debt levels in 
a large number of countries. This is why the overheating can also be branded a “debt 
overheating”.
16 The low inflationary pressures observed despite fast economic growth 
were largely due to huge inflows of labor into the world labor market as a result of 
globalization (the opening up of China, India and the countries of the former Soviet 
bloc doubled the global labor supply), which dampened wage costs (see, for example, 
Borio and Filardo, 2007). Another problem faced by monetary policy-makers before 
the crisis was pronounced movements in relative prices associated with changes in 
the global economy (for example sharp fluctuations in prices of commodities and 
agricultural production). These movements caused short-term changes in inflation 
that were quantitatively significant in relation to the inflation targets. Eventually they 
complicated the monetary policy decision-making process and exposed it to increas-
ed uncertainty. This applied much more to the central banks that were relying mainly 
on the core measures of inflation. By doing this they were taking asymmetrically 
only the downward part of the price effect of globalization (declining manufacturing 
prices) while ignoring the upward part (rising commodity prices). 
The broad debate about the excess global liquidity
17, that was going on around 
the middle of the last decade demonstrates that the risks associated with financial 
 
15 A warning sign of the development of imbalances during the last decade was that virtually all countries 
wanted a weaker, or at least not stronger, currency, which obviously was not achievable. The root causes –
of which there might have been a whole range – were not easy to identify. One possible cause was the ef-
forts of central banks in large countries to “put off” the  adjustment of the  accumulated imbalances. 
The imbalances in the USA and some other Western economies might have arisen in connection with
the “technological wave” in the late 1990s and the related over-optimistic assessment of future potential 
output growth. Similar trends could be observed in some EU countries. 
16 Borio and Lowe (2002) talk about periods of financial imbalances that are not associated with overt in-
flation pressures as “disguised overheating”. 
17 Excess global liquidity or global liquidity glut were concepts which attracted considerable attention in
pre-crisis years. They were de facto imprecise terms for excessively fast growth of credit and money. For
discussion see for example Rüffer and Stracca (2006) or Bracke and Fidora (2008).16                                      Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1 
Figure 2  Correlation between Credit Growth and Real Estate Prices  
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from BIS, IMF and Economic Intelligence Unit. 
 
market developments were not ignored. The mix of low nominal and real interest 
rates, high credit growth and a real estate price boom was observed with remarkable 
apprehension. Number of economists warned against rising propensity of the bank-
ing regulatory and accounting framework to procyclicality (Borio, Furfine and Lowe, 
2001). There was a general awareness that the easy availability of credit might be 
adding to the real estate price expansion. And in a number of countries, the credit 
growth was apparently associated with the extension of housing loans. Number of 
countries recorded real estate price growth of between than 10 to 20 percent annually 
in the pre-crisis decade. And in most of these countries, relative to income, real estate 
prices peaked historically in 2007. We plot growth in domestic credit and real estate 
prices between 1997 and 2007 in Figure 2. One can see a clear correlation between 
these variables, although causality surely cannot be automatically assigned to it. 
The opinion that the driver behind it was a credit boom fuelling bubbly increases in 
real estate prices was played down by emphasising the banks’ ability to manage risks 
better than in the past (or transfer it away from their balance sheets).
18  
5. Does the Exchange Rate Make Monetary Policy Strategy Different? 
The debate presented above unfolded primarily in the large and closed econ-
omy context. In the discussions of central bankers in small open economies, different 
and more structured views could be found. An important extension of the orthodox 
work on the small open economy case is Cecchetti et al. (2000, 2002). Its starting 
18 A nice example of a belief in a much improved risk management in banks provides the ECB survey on 
credit risk transfer by EU banks (ECB, 2004). In this survey, banks were generally expressing conviction
that credit risk management had improved greatly over recent years and their beliefs in increased sophisti-
cation of the latest credit risk models. Banks also reported that credit risk arbitrage and the deepening of 
credit derivatives markets had improved the pricing of risks involved in traditional loan portfolios, hence
contributing to a better management of overall credit risks. On the contrary, Alan Greenspan, who is often 
criticized these days for ignoring risks, warned against the risks associated with credit risk transfer at that 
time (see Greenspan, 2005) stressing that a sudden widening of credit spreads could result in unanticipated 
losses to investors in some of the newer, more complex structured credit products.  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1                                          17 
point is the finding that the primary exception to the view that asset prices do not 
belong in reaction function arose in an open-economy literature. They refer to Ball 
(1999), who finds that adding the exchange rate to the Taylor rule improves macro-
economic performance in a model where the exchange rate has a significant role in 
the transmission mechanism of structural shocks and monetary policy, and that it is 
optimal to target a measure of “long-run” inflation, i.e. inflation adjusted for the tem-
porary effects of exchange rate fluctuations. Because Ball’s model was questioned on 
the basis of the exchange rate specification in the model, Cecchetti et al. (2000) re- 
-examined the issue in the context of a small-scale macroeconomic model in which 
these two aspects of exchange rate determination were present. The results showed 
that, on average, the degree of inflation and output volatility was really diminished 
by directly reacting to the exchange rate misalignment. Cecchetti et al. (2002), while 
generally confirming their previous view, admit that the result is model-specific and 
that monetary policy reactions to the exchange rate should also be conditioned by 
the underlying sources of these movements. 
The exchange rate played a very important role indeed in the monetary condi-
tions in small economies in the pre-crisis years. And perhaps surprisingly, rather posi-
tive outcomes in terms of price and financial stability were achieved in the countries 
in which central banks responded to exchange rate pressures broadly in a flexible in-
flation-targeting style. In particular, a strategy of reacting to the appreciation pressures 
pragmatically by cutting policy rates a bit and simultaneously allowing for some ap-
preciation was working rather well. The explanation for this success is not a straight-
forward one. Basically, central bankers in small and open economies have been much 
more willing to accept that bubbles can emerge without signs of inflationary pres-
sures and that inflation measured in terms of consumer prices has not always sig-
nalled when imbalances have been building up in the economy. In some countries, 
they felt – partly as a result of their own experience – that strong credit expansion 
and increasing asset prices preceded almost all banking crises and the majority of 
deep recessions. Some of them could also easily imagine a realistic scenario in which 
a bubble builds up without visible signs of inflationary pressures.
19 Such a scenario 
can arise when higher economic growth creates excessively optimistic expectations 
about the future of the economy that lead to nominal appreciation of its currency. In 
such a situation, very low inflation can prevail even under rapid credit growth and 
asset price acceleration for rather a long time. When agents recognise that the real 
situation is not so rosy, and open inflation pressures subsequently appear, it may  
be too late for monetary policy to react. In addition, excessive demand, especially in 
small economies, may for a long time be reflected in rising current account deficits 
rather than in inflationary pressures (see Mandel and Kodera, 1995).  
Some central banks therefore understood that the risks of a hard landing from 
the build-up and bursting of large asset price bubbles warranted taking some risks in 
an attempt to moderate the problem. There were cases where the asset price misalign-
ment was sufficiently obvious that one could be confident enough to take the risk 
(see the debate on Riksbank policy below). In such cases, tightening monetary policy 
and accepting somewhat lower inflation relative to the target in the short term pro- 
 
19 Frait and Komárek (2007) discussed the issue in the open economy context concluding that central bank 
policies should be conducted at least in a way that does not promote build-up of asset market bubbles. 18                                      Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1 
Figure 3  Currency Appreciation in Selected Inflation-Targeting Economies 
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vided some chance to avoid a subsequent collapse in asset prices that could lead to 
large losses in terms of real output. Besides some tough inflation targeters, such as 
Sweden, Switzerland and Norway, such a chance was taken by the central banks that 
showed significant willingness to allow the foreign exchange value of their curren-
cies adjust in the  pre-crisis years by not resisting fully the  appreciation pressures 
(Figure 3). By doing this, these countries avoided to some extent the adverse effects 
of a general asymmetry of pre-crisis monetary policy making which consisted of a much 
greater readiness to accept some depreciation of the domestic currency relative to 
appreciation. They applied, albeit sometimes unwittingly, the prescription of the BIS 
approach, in which a successful leaning-against-the-wind policy requires the central 
bank tightens monetary conditions above the level consistent with fulfilment of the in-
flation target and reduces inflation below the inflation target. After all, it is reason-
able nominal appreciation of the currency that represents a direct and rapidly effective 
mechanism for achieving this in small open economies.
20  
An exemplary case of an inflation targeting economy with sustained apprecia-
tion pressures and an  implicit history-based macroprudential mandate in central 
bankers’ minds (thanks to a previous crisis) was that of the Czech Republic. The lo-
cal financial crisis that occurred at the end of the 1990s was resolved relatively quick- 
ly and the period since 2000 has been characterised by renewed economic growth, 
low inflation, stable and low interest rates and an appreciating currency. Due to 
the  fact that from the  outset of the  economic transition until the  present time 
the Czech currency has appreciated strongly in nominal terms against both the dollar 
and the euro, the koruna has gained the status of a safe haven currency. However, 
with this status it has also become quite sensitive to changes in global financial 
markets, especially to the  search for yield by the  international investors.
21 This 
became the  case primarily after the  key central banks resorted to accommodative 
20 Small open economies do not generally have a menu choice between the levels of interest rate and 
exchange rate. We intentionally talk about the willingness of the authorities to permit the currencies to ap-
preciate if pressures in this direction prevail. By this we emphasise that the strategy described above can 
be available in some specific periods only. 
21 Globalization and liberalization of the financial market made domestic monetary policy subject to arbi-
trage. Search for yield may be viewed as the attempt of domestic investors to avoid constraints imposed
provided by their central banks’s policy. And demand for “cheaper” loans  denominated in foreign cur-
rencies is de facto arbitrage on the side of borrowers. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1                                          19 
monetary policies following the  events of September 2001. Since then the  Czech 
koruna has exhibited a tendency to appreciate, sometimes quite sharply.
22 Despite 
the fact that the Czech economy is export-oriented and has a large manufacturing 
sector, the Czech National Bank has openly adopted the position that it cannot and 
will not try to artificially soften the conditions for domestic producers.
23 The CNB 
has explained that these are global pressures that a small economy cannot avoid and 
that businesses have to learn how to weather them. This kind of approach has con-
tributed to the flexibility of the economy – something that a small economy in 
the global competition crucially needs. Though initially it was quite difficult and for 
some painful, exporters have learned how to live with the tough exchange rate con-
ditions and have factored in the future evolution of these conditions into their expec-
tations. Labor unions have realised that currency appreciation improves the purchasing 
power of workers’ wages, which has helped to discipline wage dynamics. 
The tendency of the  koruna to appreciate over time has had a  significant 
impact on the conduct of monetary policy. As a consequence of appreciation pres-
sures, Czech inflation has often undershot the inflation target. In such a situation, 
the Czech National Bank naturally has had to keep its policy rate also at a similar or 
even lower level relative to the key central banks in order to avoid protracted and 
deep undershooting of its target. It has repeatedly communicated that its natural 
reaction in the inflation targeting framework is to cut the policy rates in case of 
strong disinflation pressures. On first impression it might appear that a policy of low 
interest rates in a converging economy must be rather suboptimal since it must lead 
to a credit boom. However, in reality this policy has served more as a shield against 
the risks coming from the external environment. Of course, the idea of using a policy 
of low interest rates in a small emerging economy to shield the country from risks 
stemming from developed countries’ policies may sound strange. The monetary scene  
in the pre-crisis years was strange indeed. One way or another, the Czech financial 
sector came out of the  crisis relatively untouched despite the  economy inevitably 
slipping into a rather sharp recession. 
The case of the Czech economy provides important lessons about how the ex-
pansionary effects of low short-term interest rates may be curtailed by the effects of 
nominal appreciation of the domestic currency. Currency appreciation can contribute 
to financial stability especially in a booming economy. It can help to reduce risks 
22 The Czech currency has thus gained a very specific position – international investors have been buying 
it as a high-yielding asset from a successful emerging market economy and some have been borrowing and
selling it because it has served, like the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen, as a funding currency for carry 
trades. Not surprisingly, after the onset of the financial turmoil in August 2007, the koruna appreciated 
sharply. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, market sentiment towards the emerging markets in gen-
eral, and the CEE region in particular, turned quite negative, which led to a sharp depreciation of all 
the regional currencies, the koruna being the exception only to a limited extent. Once the markets settled in 
2009, the koruna set off on an appreciation trend again, and like some other emerging economies it has
occasionally been exposed to search-for-yield induced pressures. 
23 The CNB’s attitude to exchange rate management has evolved over time. While there were three epi-
sodes of interventions against the  exchange rate appreciation in the  early years of inflation targeting, 
the CNB has not used direct foreign exchange interventions since late-2002. In the latter phase, the only 
measure indirectly affecting the exchange rate was an agreement with the government on purchases of pri-
vatization revenues (and more recently of the inflow of EU structural and cohesion funds) into the CNB’s 
foreign exchange reserves. Since Spring 2008, the IMF has classified the Czech de facto exchange rate 
regime as free floating.  20                                      Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1 
through a “favorable” nominal illusion. An appreciating currency will decrease 
the growth rate of nominal income, which may restrict over-optimism regarding its 
future trend. This can, in turn, slow the growth in loan demand down. Such an “il-
lusion” means that the households will compare low interest rates with slow growth 
in nominal income, all expressed in the domestic currency. In reality, the purchasing 
power of nominal income will be increasing relatively fast thanks to the currency 
appreciation, but households will not reflect it in their decision-making. Evidence for 
the existence of this kind of “illusion” has been provided by the experience of a group  
of countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Seemingly, sustained currency 
appreciation should create an  incentive to borrow in a  currency that is becoming 
cheaper over time, i.e. in foreign currency. Nevertheless, the share of foreign curren-
cy loans provided to households has been lowest in two countries with a history of 
profound and sustained nominal currency appreciation – the  Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. It may thus be said that households from these countries have “suffered” 
from an illusion in a sense they have ingnored the opportunity to take advantage of 
the appreciation by deciding that when borrowing they would do so in the domestic 
currency only.  
There may be other factors specific to a small open economy at play too. First, 
if the economy is export-oriented, sustained exchange rate appreciation may work 
against the formation of overly optimistic expectations in the corporate sector,
24 
which tames the potential for credit-enabled excessive investment and creation of 
unprofitable capacity. It may also shift part of the existing domestic demand from 
nontradables to tradables along a  long-term trend towards higher consumption of 
nontradables, thus contributing to more balanced macroeconomic and structural dy-
namics. One should not forget that in an  environment characterised by currency 
appreciation and low domestic interest rates households do not have any incentive to 
borrow in a foreign currency, which insulates their balance sheets from exchange rate 
risk.
25 In addition, with low interest rates the currency is not an attractive target, at 
least for some classes of speculators, which can partially reduce its volatility.  
Still, one can hardly argue that pursing domestic currency appreciation can be 
a general way to promote financial stability. It is more a specific case relevant for some 
particular periods only. Especially, it can serve a purpose during the exuberant times 
associated with significant gains in productivity and accompanied by expectation-led 
credit boom. In this case, achieving desired monetary tightening via stronger cur-
24 In a country with a high share of tradables in production (an export-oriented economy with a strong 
manufacturing sector), the monetary conditions and financial constraints on the corporate sector may be 
significantly influenced by changes in the external value of the currency. In particular, trend nominal ap-
preciation or a prolonged period of a “strong” currency will create monetary and financial constraints for
the relevant sectors and thus reduce the risk of implementation of investment projects with relatively low
profitability (i.e. projects profitable only under expectations of very low interest rates).  
25 There are those who believe that the rapid growth in real estate prices in the Czech Republic in 2005–
–2009 was due also to very low short-term rates and their contribution to the demand for housing credit. 
But it was probably due to the combination of expected significant increase in the VAT on housing con-
struction and the emergence of optimistic expectations about future income. After all, a similar boom was 
observed in other CEE countries, where central banks maintained much higher rates. In these countries, 
however, the maintaining of higher domestic interest rates resulted in households and corporations switch-
ing to foreign currency loans, which further increased the risks to financial stability (see also Čihák and 
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rency may be preferable to sharp interest rate increases (see also section 7). In other 
cases, pushing for nominal appreciation of domestic currency may represent a dance 
on the  razor’s edge and thus bring about rather negative side effects (see Égert, 
2007).  
The Czech Republic was not the only country that permitted for strong ap-
preciation of its currency, inflation target undershooting or both in the  pre-crisis 
period. Similar patterns could be observed in other inflation targeters, for example 
Switzerland, Slovakia, Canada, Korea, Norway and Sweden. The case of Sweden is 
particularly interesting, since Giavazzi and Mishkin (2006) argue that the Riksbank 
made a serious mistake in its communication strategy in the mid-2000s by discussing 
the role of asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy.
26 Not only do they suggest 
that the  Riksbank should have clarified that asset prices (housing prices and ex-
change rates) are not independent targets for monetary policy, but also they sug-
gested that, given the persistent undershooting of the inflation target, monetary policy 
should have leaned towards more expansionary policy. From the current perspective, 
Giavazzi and Mishkin give preference to purity in policy communication at the ex-
pense of pursuing long-term stability of the economy. Under the post-crisis consen-
sus (see section  6), a  lean-against-the-wind policy producing an  undershooting of 
the inflation target would be viewed as natural in a period of credit boom and rising 
housing prices.  
6. Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in the New Consensus 
The crisis that started in 2007 made monetary economists aware of some defi-
ciencies in the prevailing flexible inflation targeting framework. Following the lessons 
of the crisis, both academic economists and central bankers have started to discuss 
a possibility of reaching a new consensus. Before we describe this, let us restate 
the basic characteristics of the “old” view. In the terminology of Borio, English and 
Filardo (2003), the move to the new consensus can be labelled as a partial shift from 
the “continuity” view to the “new-environment” view. The authors describe the con-
tinuity view as one which saw the  pre-crisis economic environment as a  natural 
extension of that which had prevailed during much of the  inflationary period of 
the 1970s and 1980s. Central banks, while acknowledging the changes that occurred 
during the Great Moderation, interpreted them essentially as unusual shocks in the con-
text of a fairly stable macroeconomic environment or model of the economy. They 
thought that the dynamics of the economic system had not significantly changed. In 
particular, growth in aggregate demand outpacing that of supply, and so a wider out-
put gap, was seen as generating upward pressure on prices. This type of view tended 
to rely heavily on models where there was a close correlation between output gaps 
and inflation and where the inflation rate itself was a key variable reflecting distor-
tions in the economy. In such a view, the role of financial markets in the policy 
framework was fairly modest. It reflected primarily the marginal contributions that 
26 “The discussion […] does not justify the Riksbank focusing independently on housing prices in setting 
the repo rate as it seems to have done in its recent statements. Furthermore, housing prices have rarely led
to financial instability because it is easier for financial institutions to assess the credit risk in residential 
mortgages, and households are very reluctant to default on these mortgages.” See Giavazzi and Mishkin
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such variables make to forecasts of output and inflation over a policy horizon of one 
to three years. Similarly, possible financial imbalances, including rising household or 
business debt burdens, were seen as suggesting downside risks to the outlook, but 
they were not generally expected to play a central role. In a period of rapid non-in-
flationary growth, high investment and strong productivity gains, fast growth in lev-
erage was seen as justified by more rapid anticipated growth in incomes and higher 
returns on investment. 
The first and apparently most extensive subject of corrections of the “conti-
nuity view” framework is the way how the financial sector is covered in existing 
models. Mishkin (2010) admits that the changes in the  financial sector have a far 
greater impact on economic activity than previously assumed and that the principle 
according to which financial frictions play an important role in business cycles was 
well understood, but was not explicitly part of the models used for policy analysis in 
central banks. One of the key reasons is that the models work with a representative- 
-agent framework in which all agents are alike, whereas financial frictions require 
that agents differ. He concludes that the representative-agent  framework  together 
with the linear-quadratic framework are two key elements of the pre-crisis theory of 
optimal monetary policy that are undermined by the lessons from the crisis.
27 A more 
realistic description of financial sectors in macroeconomic models will also have to 
deal with the limited rationality of agents and imperfect efficiency of financial mar-
kets.  
Economists now broadly agree that it is necessary to rework fundamentally 
the way that monetary policy transmission is described in macroeconomic models. 
Treatment of transmission was clearly oversimplified, especially as regards various 
channels related to financial institutions’ activities and the tendency to behave pro- 
-cyclically. Carney (2009) admits that central banks have effectively treated the trans-
mission mechanism as uncertain but fixed when it is in fact highly variable and 
procyclical – it is a function of regulation, which changes over time; financial inno-
vations, which often evolve to circumvent regulation; and confidence, which is in-
fluenced by monetary policy in ways not commonly acknowledged. Even the models 
that did encompass financial intermediation usually worked only with a simple “bank 
lending channel” or “broad credit channel” (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) containing 
a financial accelerator mechanism in which interest rate changes affected the credit 
market through changes in asset and collateral values.  
Some authors suggest concentrating more on the “credit supply channel” or 
“risk taking channel”, which differs from the broad credit channel in focusing on 
credit amplifications due to financing frictions in the lending sector, not in the sector 
of non-financial borrowers. This channel considers the link between monetary policy, 
the perception and pricing of risk by economic agents, and credit provision. It pro-
27 Our view is that these models suffered from the fallacy of composition in a way similar to micro-
prudential regulation and supervision since they treated financial system as a simple sum of its individual 
components. In this respect Buiter (2009) concludes that in the crisis the knowledge of these models was 
rather useless, saying that “the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England […] contained […] 
quite a strong representation of academic economists and other professional economists with serious tech-
nical training and backgrounds. This turned out to be a severe handicap when the central bank had to 
switch gears and change from being an inflation-targeting central bank…to a financial stability-oriented 
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vides an explanation of how monetary policy in a booming economy may promote 
excessive risk taking leading to higher leverage, maturity- and other asset-liability 
mismatches which make the financial system more fragile. There are basically three 
forces behind the channel. First, low returns on investments, such as government 
bonds, may increase incentives for banks, asset managers and insurance companies to 
take on more risk, for example to meet a target nominal return. This is the search-for- 
-yield mechanism defined by Rajan (2006). The second stream focuses on the impact 
of changes in policy rates on either risk perceptions or risk tolerance and hence on 
the degree of risk in portfolios, on the pricing of assets, and on the availability of 
credit. Borio and Zhu (2008) and Adrian and Shin (2008) explain how low interest 
rates may affect asset prices, collateral valuations, incomes and cash flows, which in 
turn can modify how banks perceive and measure risk. The influence on risk percep-
tions is manifested through procyclical behavior of estimates of probabilities of de-
fault, loss given default, volatilities and correlations. Third, as explained by Borio 
and Zhu (2008), risk-taking may be boosted by central bank communication, espe-
cially by the asymmetrical commitment of to clean in the risk-materialization phase 
of the financial cycle (the Greenspan put). The existence of the risk-taking channel 
has been supported by the empirical findings. Gambacorta (2009) finds evidence of 
a significant link between the extended period of low interest rates prior to the crisis 
and banks’ risk-taking associated with the underestimation of the future default rates. 
In a similar manner, Maddaloni, Peydró and Scopel (2008) find robust evidence that 
lower overnight rates soften bank credit standards, both for the average and also for 
riskier loans, while Adrian and Shin (2008)
28 find out that monetary policy has a sig-
nificant effect on the behavior of highly leveraged intermediaries.  
There is another important mechanism interconnected to the  credit supply 
channel – the “bank capital channel” (Van den Heuvel, 2006 and 2009), in which 
monetary policy affects bank lending through its impact on bank equity capital. If 
monetary policy actions affect bank profits, then over time this will accumulate to 
changes in bank capital. Starting from a position of a binding capital requirement, 
any change in bank capital can in turn have a potentially large effect on lending. This 
particular channel becomes rather important in times of stress, when it restricts 
lending activity by threatening banks to breach minimum capital requirements.  
Economists have already started trying to incorporate the newly defined chan-
nels into the monetary policy framework. Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) propose 
a  simple adjustment of the  Taylor rule by a  factor proportional to the  increase in 
the  credit spread (the spread between the  interest rates available to savers and 
28 Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009) document the link between lower interest rates and risk-taking for invest-
ment banks in the United States. They stress that balance sheets of market-based financial intermediaries 
(broker-dealers) represent a source of monetary policy transmission, working through capital market con-
ditions. Short-term interest rates are determinants of the cost of leverage and are important in influencing 
the funding conditions and the size of financial intermediary balance sheets. A difference of a quarter or 
half a percent of the funding cost may make all the difference between a profitable venture and a loss-
-making one for leveraged financial intermediaries. In other words, cuts in the policy rate increase the net 
interest margin for financial intermediaries, making them more profitable and optimistic. Adrian and Shin
conclude that financial intermediaries lie at the heart of both monetary policy transmission as well as poli-
cies towards financial stability and their balance sheet conditions are informative both on macroeconomic
variables as well as the resilience of the financial system. The two policies are therefore just two sides of 
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borrowers). However, capturing the impact of financial frictions on macroeconomic 
dynamics only by implementing changes in credit spreads in the Taylor rule is clearly 
just a partial solution. Woodford (2010a) himself states that what is needed is a frame-
work in which intermediation plays a crucial role and in which frictions that can 
impede the efficient supply of credit are allowed for. The construction of such a frame-
work will constitute a major challenge for monetary economists in the years ahead.  
The next significant move in monetary economists’ and central bankers’ think-
ing is the gradual acceptance of the opinion long held by BIS economists (see Borio 
and White, 2004; White, 2009) that the asymmetric “can’t lean, but can clean” ap-
proach to monetary policy creates sources of long-term instability and that optimal 
monetary policy should be much more symmetric. There is considerable, though not 
full, agreement that monetary policy should clean to a certain extent after the effects 
of a financial crisis surface. There are also signs of agreement regarding the recom-
mendation to respond in good times to the financial cycle and the build-up of risks to 
financial stability with monetary policy instruments even when no major risks to 
price stability are yet apparent. This applies primarily to episodes characterised by 
fast growth of real estate prices with a simultaneous credit boom.  
Such a move may reflect recognition that macroeconomic dynamics are strong- 
ly non-linear due to the “excessive elasticity of the system” (see section 3). In such 
a system, fundamental sources of systemic risk arise at times when banks as well as 
their clients consider the risk to be at its lowest. If, during a boom, corporations, 
households and the government observe low interest rates relative to current income 
growth, they succumb to the illusion and start regarding it as a new long-term trend. 
This further increases their willingness to take on more and more debt, which is ex-
tended by banks with softened lending standards. Subsequently, a positive feedback 
loop between credit, asset prices and incomes starts to operate. If the financial cycle 
becomes too strong, the build-up of debt may reach an unsustainable level. Market 
participants will at some point realise the true nature of the situation and start to sell 
their overvalued assets, and a financial crisis will break out. In turn, banks will 
tighten their lending standards, and their clients’ demand for credit will fall sharply. 
In an environment of greatly increased uncertainty, a phase of sharp deleveraging be-
gins, potentially leading to depressed output and inflation. 
As a result of the aforementioned lessons, academic economists started into 
come up with proposals to increase room for manoeuvre in their models of flexible 
inflation targeting, which are essentially based on the mechanisms described in the BIS 
economists’ papers referred to in section 3 (see for example Woodford, 2010). We sum 
up these proposals below and describe the outcome as the New Consensus. By this 
we mean an amended model of flexible inflation or price-level targeting in which 
the central bank “should sometimes lean but can still clean”. In this framework, fi-
nancial stability becomes a separate objective of the central bank, affecting its short- 
-term behavior without changing its long-term commitment to price stability. 
The primary instruments for safeguarding financial stability are still financial market 
regulation, capitalisation of financial institutions and macroprudential policy meas-
ures (these should also involve the modifications in the regulatory framework aimed 
at reducing its procyclical features). Since these instruments may not be sufficient to 
curb the enthusiasm in the financial system and reduce the risks to financial stability, 
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Figure 4  Financial Cycle, Financial Stability and Monetary Policy  
          
 
monetary policy cannot ignore the risk of financial instability and acts pre-emptively 
when financial imbalances occur. Central banks start to lean against the wind and 
become ready to justify, via convincing public communication, the desirability of set-
ting of interest rates at a level different from that consistent with achieving the inflation 
target (the pure inflation targeting rate in Figure 4) even at the expense of inflation 
slipping below the target for some time. We have to stress again two critical assump-
tions. First, the pre-emptive reaction described above is relevant in cases of joint credit 
and real estate booms.
29 Second, the bulk of the action has to be taken on the prudential 
policy level, while monetary policy can only provide co-insurance. 
The cornerstone of this framework is the canon that the object of the reaction 
of the monetary authority should be the growing financial imbalances generated by 
a credit boom, which may potentially result in strong macroeconomic fluctuations, and 
not the asset market bubbles themselves. The risk of financial instability, or the risk  
of a future crisis, assessed and quantified in a certain way, rather than the target for 
credit growth or for the credit-to-GDP ratio, should determine the reaction. Since 
the monetary cycle is on average considerably shorter than the financial cycle, the re-
action to the risk of financial instability will be occasional, irregular and strongly 
29 The authorities have to look at a broad definition of credit comprised of any source of external finance
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non-linear. At normal times, the monetary policy framework should therefore still 
behave almost identically to orthodox flexible inflation targeting. Financial stability 
considerations will become a factor of monetary policy reaction only if times are 
departing from the normal, i.e. when the authorities conclude that a certain threshold 
of financial vulnerability has been exceeded, leading to a high risk of financial in-
stability. In such a situation policy makers will consider the need to restrain lending 
growth and excessive risk taking (the excess leverage in short). It will not be appro-
priate to follow the simple Taylor rule in the crisis materialisation phase, either. If it 
occurs, it will be necessary to supplement the rule with a reaction to an increase in 
risk margins in response to the reassessment of credit risk or other risks, i.e. to offset 
the sharply increased risk margins with a more pronounced fall in monetary policy 
rates (meaning that monetary policy should clean to a certain extent) in periods of 
the immense risks for financial stability.  
In the following passages, we will provide our own interpretation of the prop-
erties of the  new framework in terms of the  understanding of the  recent crisis, 
the reaction of monetary policy to it and current views of the macroprudential policy 
framewok. For the sake of simplicity, we will present the variables linearly and de-
pict the crisis as a point in time. This description is intentionally extremely stylised. 
The  key concepts of the  model are leverage and the  risk of financial instability 
(marginal crisis risk
30), which determine the dynamics of monetary policy or its re-
action to financial stability objective. 
Leverage in panel I of Figure 4 approximates characteristics of the financial 
cycle (credit dynamics, the debt ratio of economic agents, the financial investors’ 
lever length, the extent of maturity transformation by banks, etc.). The level of lever-
age increases until the  point when the  crisis breaks out, then gradually declines, 
although remaining high in the initial phase of the crisis. Although the level of lev-
erage is high on both sides of the crisis point, the situations are very different – 
the level is increasing in the optimistic phase (when many agents do not realise that 
they are only in temporarily good times) and declining in the pessimistic phase (when 
agents may be well aware that bad times are on the way). Since leverage in the stock 
sense adjusts to changed economic conditions with a significant lag, it cannot be 
a monetary policy response variable – such a variable must be a forward-looking one 
that describes the current level of risk for future financial stability. In panel II this 
variable is termed the risk of financial instability.  
The (marginal) risk of financial instability in panel II is a strongly discon-
tinuous variable that increases in good times as leverage rises and sharply falls when 
crisis occurs. It describes marginal contribution of current financial environment to 
the risk of a crisis in the future. A fundamental requirement for growth in the risk of 
financial instability – in addition to the availability of cheap credit – is the emergence 
of overly optimistic expectations about future income and asset prices, which lead to 
the  development of a  bubble. When the  bubble bursts and the  financial crisis be-
30 The marginal crisis risk in Woodford (2010) or macroeconomic risk in Mishkin (2010) could be imple-
mented in the form of a joint index of vulnerability and over-optimistic expectations not only into mone-
tary policy models, but also into models for calculating macroprudential instruments such as countercyclical
capital buffers. An index like this would be based not on the EWS indicator, but on financial cycle in-
dicators such as the credit-to-GDP ratio, credit growth, the properly defined output gap or a measure of
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comes openly visible, the level of this risk changes dramatically. Banks revise their 
perception of the risks to their balance sheets by increasing risk margins, tightening 
lending standards and limiting the availability of credit. Economic agents become 
over-pessimistic and reduce their demand for credit. A phase of deleveraging sets in. 
It is the factors of expectations and risk perception which cause such a strong discon-
tinuity. Monetary policy should respond to the risk of financial instability by raising 
interest rates sharply when it is rising. By doing so, it will partly offset the under-
estimation of risk by banks and their clients. After the crisis erupts, monetary policy 
should be eased rapidly in response to sharp upward risk revaluation by financial 
market participants (higher than the normal credit spreads occur) and can keep clean-
ing, if necessary, during the period when the risk of financial instability is rising from 
negative values to zero. 
Panel III in comparison with panel II shows the difference between the build- 
-up and materialization of risks. In good times, when the risk of financial instability 
is rising, current default rates drop, the non-performing loan ratio declines, banks 
create fewer provisions and report low credit losses. In this period, the resilience of 
the financial sector seems very high. When the crisis breaks out, the situation is re-
versed and banks and their regulators start to assess – by means of stress tests – 
whether the  financial sector will withstand the  materialisation of risks. The  panel   
in Figure 4 emphasises the rule that financial stability analyses must be focused in 
good times on assessing the risk of financial instability and in bad times on measur-
ing the  magnitude of the  problem related to the  materialisation of risks that were 
previously “allowed” to build up. Given the  forward-looking nature of monetary 
policy, central banks’ staff in their analyses have to focus on the identification of 
the latent future risks brought about by current developments in the financial sector. 
This is rather difficult since the contemporaneous indicators (such as asset prices, in-
comes, trading volumes or provisioning costs) talk about the materialization of sys-
temic risk, not about the probability of financial instability in the future. What is 
needed is a set of forward-looking indicators providing insight into the potential for 
financial imbalances. Those that based on the deviations of the current values of the in-
dicators such as credit-to-GDP or ratio of real estate prices to income from their 
long-term trends appear most promising (for details see for example Borio and Dreh-
mann, 2009).  
Panel IV shows a  monetary policy reaction in which the  necessary non- 
-linearity is deliberately ignored. In the  risk build-up period, when the  risk of fi-
nancial instability is rising, monetary policy rates should at some point rise sharply 
above the neutral level consistent with “pure” inflation targeting (i.e. inflation target-
ing that does not take into account aspects of financial stability). When the crisis 
breaks out, the central bank should respond with sharp rate cuts. As the economy 
recovers, rates would then start to be increased back to the neutral level.  
An interesting question is how inflation would evolve in the framework de-
scribed above. The prevailing (Woodfordian) monetary policy models assume price- 
-level targeting, which is still controversial from the public policy point of view. 
Since inflation would be below the target in good times owing to the central bank’s 
deliberate attempt to lean against the wind, and would also be below the target in bad 
times as a result of low demand, a period of “overshooting” would have to follow in 
which inflation would be higher than the target in order to ensure that the targeted 28                                      Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1 
price level is achieved. This would have to be done solely by keeping interest rates 
low in the “cleaning” period (or maybe even in a “prolonged cleaning” period con-
taining a phase of increasing leverage above the equilibrium level and an increasing 
positive risk of financial crisis). In literature such as Woodford (2003), a price-level 
target is a kind of rule that operates as an automatic stabiliser, helping to minimise 
the risk of deflation. In the event of a sharp decline in demand leading to an under-
shooting of the  inflation target, agents expect a  policy leading to a  subsequent 
overshooting of the target to follow. In the real world of monetary policy-making, 
many issues regarding the conduct of price-level targeting would surely arise. These 
go far beyond the traditional worries about the ability to communicate and are cur-
rently untested.  
7. The New Consensus and Post-Crisis Policy Making  
Where are the advanced Western economies in the above stylised framework 
at the start of 2011? Probably in the immediate post-crisis period, in which monetary 
policy rates should remain low, as “underlying” monetary policy-relevant inflation 
remains below the target level and the negative marginal crisis risk “prescribes” keep-
ing monetary policy rates even further below the level consistent with pure inflation 
targeting. And even if these economies were located much further to the right, they 
would still be at a point where the marginal crisis risk is zero or slightly positive. At 
this point, the central bank should act in virtually the same way as under standard 
flexible inflation targeting. This assumes a strongly non-linear monetary policy reac-
tion to financial instability. In a real, non-model economy, however, monetary policy 
decision-making is always complicated by other factors. The rise in commonly used 
inflation measures, stemming from global growth in prices of food, commodities and 
energy, has been just such a factor since the end of 2010. 
At this juncture, it may be very difficult to evaluate the  current economic 
environment and the contribution of monetary policy to it – and not only in large 
advanced economies. The monetary policy rates of key central banks like the Fed or 
the ECB may currently appear abnormally low given the recovery in economic ac-
tivity. However, the countries hit hardest by the crisis are still experiencing low 
credit growth and continuing deleveraging, which may have repressive effects, espe-
cially in overindebted economies where pessimistic expectations are prevalent. Mone-
tary policy-makers are thus facing the dilemma of whether to tighten monetary policy 
and thereby limit the risks associated with the search for yield, or to maintain an easy 
policy and thereby dampen the adverse effects of deleveraging. If they simulta-
neously applied the logic of price-level targeting, they would have to keep interest 
rates low for a sustained period in order to rectify the previous undershooting with 
a period of overshooting by means of an “intentionally irresponsible policy”. 
However, the monetary policies of large advanced economies have consider-
able implications for many countries, especially emerging ones. Their central banks 
are attempting to maintain very easy monetary conditions by keeping interest rates 
very low or by using quantitative easing or other ways of supporting banks’ balance- 
-sheet liquidity. Owing to the low yields on assets denominated in key currencies, 
smaller countries may become exposed to the search for yield resulting from efforts 
to invest the “unliquidated” portion of liquidity from the boom period in some higher- 
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policy rates rapidly in line with flexible inflation targeting while the large central 
banks were de facto implementing price-level targeting policies, it would imply fu-
ture nominal appreciation of the smaller countries’ currencies against the key cur-
rencies. And as financial markets respond in a forward-looking and non-linear way, it 
could lead to a  Dornbuschian overshooting appreciation of the  smaller countries’ 
currencies.  
The impact of the low nominal yields in some large advanced countries on 
the  developments in fundamentally sound emerging economies via capital flows 
driven by the search for yield became a hot topic in the economic policy debate in 
2010 (see Economist, 2010). This topic has become relevant to quite a large group of 
countries, some of which are relatively large and therefore have a stronger voice. For 
some countries, at least for the Czech Republic the case study of which was present-
ed in section 5, this is not a new issue. The Czech National Bank has had to discuss 
the effect of foreign investors’ search for yield on the exchange rate, and therefore 
also on monetary policy decisions, regularly since 2001. The general lesson derived 
from its experience is that in small open economies, in certain periods under a given 
setting of external monetary policies and the financial markets’ expectations about 
domestic anti-inflationary monetary policy strategy, the first best monetary policy 
solution (higher rates and slower nominal appreciation of domestic currency) may 
not be available and it therefore may be necessary to implement the second best 
policy (low rates and a relatively fast appreciation of the currency). In other words, 
the desired monetary conditions were achieved in the given period, but mostly thanks 
to the exchange rate component, whereas the interest rate component remained prob-
ably sub-optimally relaxed.  
Posen (2009) uses the constraints faced by small open economies as an argu-
ment against the lean against the wind strategy, saying that open economies that raise 
interest rates to cut off booms can find that policy makes matters worse because 
the interest rate tightening attracts greater capital inflows and exacerbates their prob-
lems. We believe that this thinking reflects an unwarranted use of the closed econ-
omy approach. In these instances, open economies should accord with the logic of 
a monetary conditions index (see Mayes and Virén, 2000). Such logic is consistent 
with the approach recommended by Cecchetti et al. (2002), who conclude that when 
external financial disturbances hitting the economy are the sole source of shocks, it is 
desirable to lean against the wind of exchange rate changes, since doing so prevents 
these shocks from destabilising the real sector of the economy. In the cases discussed 
above, open economies therefore have to achieve the desired monetary tightening via 
a combination of currency appreciation and policy rate adjustment, and simultane-
ously to try to cut off part of the boom via various macroprudential measures, includ-
ing fiscal ones (the various tools applied are discussed in IMF, 2010, and Moreno, 
2011). Due to the current state of the world economy, or more precisely lingering 
global imbalances, a significant number of central banks from emerging market econ-
omies or small advanced economies will probably have more than enough opportu-
nities to test alternative approaches to coping with financial pressures originating in 
the  external environment. The  availability of the  new consensus optimal solution 
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8. Conclusion 
The financial crisis that started in 2007 significantly modified views con-
cerning the relationship between monetary policy, asset prices and financial stability. 
One of the most powerful forces to have shaken the orthodox framework of flexible 
inflation targeting was the  financial tsunami effect, i.e. a  decline in risk premia 
during the tranquil years of the Great Moderation, replaced by a destructive tidal in-
crease in credit spreads at the outset of the crisis.  
With respect to the appropriate reaction of monetary policy to booms in asset 
prices and build-ups of financial imbalances, we have confronted the predominant 
pre-crisis view in both academia and the central banking community with the alter-
native view of BIS economists. The former was that a central bank should pay at-
tention to asset market developments, but cannot and should not try to constrain as-
set price bubbles on their own. The latter posited that asset price bubbles had been 
the wrong focus and a proper emphasis should be placed on financial imbalances and 
the risks of financial instability. We conclude that following an assessment of what 
happened during the last decade the approach favoured by the economic profession 
has begun to shift from benign neglect to leaning against the wind. Such a shift may 
institute fundamental changes to the existing monetary policy paradigm, especially 
via the way the financial sector and its role in the transmission mechanism is covered 
in the existing models. The modified paradigm emerging right now we label the new 
consensus.  
We have illustrated our view of the new consensus as an amended model of 
flexible inflation targeting in which the central bank “should sometimes lean and can 
still clean”. In this model, financial stability becomes a separate objective of the cen-
tral bank, affecting its short-term behaviour without changing its long-term commit-
ment to price stability. However, at normal times, the monetary policy framework 
behaves almost identically to orthodox flexible inflation targeting. Only if a certain 
threshold of financial vulnerability is exceeded, leading to a high marginal risk of fi-
nancial instability, does monetary policy start to lean against the wind pre-emptively.  
We have added the small open economy context to the framework and explain-
ed that the optimal reactions of monetary policy-makers in small open economies 
may significantly differ and that in certain periods, under given external monetary 
policies and financial markets’ expectations about domestic monetary policy strate-
gy, the  first-best policy solution may simply not be available. In such instances, 
second-best policies have to be considered. These could in some specific periods 
operate in accord with the logic of a monetary conditions index in which a desired 
monetary policy stance is achieved as a mix of particular exchange rate and policy 
rate adjustments, with simultaneous support from relevant macroprudential measures.  
We expect the features of the new consensus to become embodied in both 
the macroeconomic models and monetary policy frameworks of central banks. This 
process will certainly take some time, and in the meantime those responsible for 
monetary policy-making may occasionally need to work creatively with the features 
of the new consensus above and beyond the currently available analytical and model-
ling approaches. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 1                                          31 
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